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THE MARKET FOR DEADBEATS
MARGARET F. BRINIG and F. H. BUCKLEY*
ABSTRACT
This article outlines three explanations for why states seek migrants and tests
them by reference to 1985-90 interstate migration flows. On race-for-the-top theo-
ries, states compete for value-increasing migrants by offering them healthy econo-
mies and efficient laws. On vote-seeking theories, states compete for clienteles
of voters, with some states seeking to attract and some to deter welfare- or
tax-loving migrants. On deadbeat theories, states compete for high human capital
debtors by offering them a fresh start from out-of-state creditors. Our findings
support vote-seeking and deadbeat theories.
THIS article asks how states attract and repel migrants. We assume that
states have an interest in the identity of their subjects, for migration
changes life for natives as well as for migrants. Because migrants might
confer external gains or impose external costs on natives, immigration
states have an incentive to attract desirable and repel undesirable mi-
grants. The result is a race to the top if the state adopts efficient policies
to attract value-increasing migrants. The most prominent example of such
a theory is Frederick Jackson Turner's frontier thesis,' under which west-
ern U.S. states adopted liberal laws and democratic values to attract
migrants from eastern states.
The race need not be to the top, however. A state might compete for
migrants on the basis of their expected political sympathies, and not for
their ability to benefit natives. For example, a pro-welfare political party
might seek to attract pro-welfare migrants through the promise of wealth
transfers from wealthy natives. In this way, an unpopular politician might
* Professors, George Mason University School of Law. This article was written with the
generous help of the George Mason University School of Law. We thank Doug Allen,
Lloyd Cohen, Esther Goldberg, David Levy, Larry Ribstein, Larry Weiss, and an anony-
mous referee of this Journal for their helpful comments. Previous drafts of this article were
presented at INSEAD, Fountainebleau, France, and at the Canadian Law and Economics
Association.
1 F. J. Turner, The Frontier in American History (reprint 1986).
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seek to prorogue an existing electorate and elect a new one more to his
liking. This kind of migration is unlikely to result in efficiency gains and
consumes deadweight moving costs.
A race to the bottom might also result from a competition for deadbeat
migrants. We define a deadbeat as one who crosses state lines to avoid
repayment of a debt. The debt might be a consumer loan owed to a
financing company, a personal loan from a friend, or an obligation of
spousal or child support. Given collection costs, moving away increases
the probability that the creditor will write off the debt as a bad debt. The
debtor might also reduce the probability of repayment by moving to a
state with pro-debtor insolvency laws. We suggest that the prospect of
deadbeat migration might lead a state to adopt pro-debtor laws. Dead-
beats are often entrepreneurs or professionals with high future earnings,
and the cost of their default is born primarily by out-of-state creditors.
Gains to natives from deadbeat migration might thus exceed the costs
borne by native debtors and creditors on the enactment of inefficient
insolvency laws.
Prior law and economics scholarship has ignored the competition for
migrants. In this article we begin to repair this omission. In Section I,
we describe the market for migrants. The competition for migrants is
benign when states seek to attract value-increasing migrants by enacting
efficient laws. However, the competition may be value-reducing when it
is for migrant votes or for deadbeats. In Section II, we report on an
econometric study of recent interstate migration trends. Our predictors
of migration flows include distance, temperature, economic conditions,
welfare and tax policies, as well as pro-deadbeat laws. The results of our
econometric analysis are presented in Section III. Our principal finding
is that recent migration flows are consistent with deadbeat and tax-
motivated migration theories.
I. THE MARKET FOR MIGRANTS
A market for migrants exists when immigration or emigration states
tailor their policies to attract a favored or repel a disfavored class of
migrants. In the past, states competed for migrants through insolvency
laws and homestead rights. Today, a state might compete for low-income
migrants through higher welfare payouts2 or for high-income migrants
2 Some states adopt a more active policy to deal with unwanted natives, paying moving
expenses when they leave the state. Laurence R. Stains, The Latinization of Allentown,
Pa., N.Y. Times Magazine, May 15, 1994, at 56, 59-60.
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through lower tax burdens. In addition, states might still compete for
migrants through pro-deadbeat laws.
Migration offers several benefits for the immigration state. During the
colonial period, and for much of the nineteenth century, America experi-
enced labor shortages and looked to migration, particularly from Europe,
for fresh workers. 3 Through migration, America resolved border prob-
lems with Canada and Mexico and reduced the threat of Indian wars.
Fresh migrants also promoted scale economies, with better schools, in-
creased markets for products, and improved methods of transportation.
With the advent of modem welfare and fiscal legislation, migration ef-
fected a wealth transfer from emigration to immigration state natives.
Migrants were relatively young, industrious, and healthy. After their
schooling in the emigration state, they moved to their new state, where
they worked for a relatively long time before they retired. The emigration
state subsidized their education but lost them as taxpayers, while the
immigration state gained people who contributed more in taxes and con-
sumed less in welfare benefits than natives.5
The claim that migration benefits natives is more controversial today
than in the past. Economies of scale are more speculative, congestion
costs are greater, and several states now seek restrictions on international
immigration. But this is not to say that the market for migrants has disap-
peared. Even states that seek to exclude international migrants might still
want internal (or interstate) migrants, the subject of this study. Finally,
a state takes a position in the market for migrants when it seeks to deter
their entry through changes in legal policies.
Moving is costly, and for most of us the migration decision is made
deliberately and soberly, not unadvisedly and lightly. From this, we might
wrongly conclude that few people move, and never because of differences
3 See David W. Galenson, White Servitude in Colonial America: An Economic Analysis
(1981); David W. Galenson, Traders, Planters and Slaves (1986); Frank Craven Wesley,
Red, White and Black: The Seventeenth Century Virginian (1971); Richard S. Dunn, Ser-
vants and Slaves: The Recruitment and Employment of Labor, in Colonial British America:
Essays in the New History of the Early Modern Era (Jack B. Greene & J. R. Pole eds.
1984).
4 See Douglas W. Allen, Homesteading and Property Rights; or, "How the West Was
Really Won," 34 J. Law & Econ. 1 (1991).
5 There is considerable evidence that international immigration has benefited natives.
See Julian Simon, The Economic Consequences of Immigration (1989). The current debate
about immigration centers on whether post-1980 immigrants are as valuable as their prede-
cessors. See George J. Bojas, Friends or Strangers: The Impact of Immigration on the
Economy (1990) (arguing that recent immigrants are less skilled and more likely to rely on
welfare than pre-1980 immigrants).
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in legal regimes. But over our lives we do move often, and not infre-
quently across state lines. In 1990, nearly 40 percent of Americans were
living in a different state from the one in which they were born. 6 The
migration decision should thus be seen from a life-cycle perspective, as
the sum of all moving decisions made over the course of one's life. So
viewed, moving is less painful than it might seem at the moment of the
move and the last walk away from the family house. For migrants, the
psychic costs of moving might indeed be exceeded by those of staying
put. The influence of socioeconomic predictors on the migration decision
may also be more easily seen from a life-cycle perspective. We might
think we can offer a full explanation of our last move by reference to
wholly personal considerations: education, a marriage, a better job offer.
But if we should try to say how it is that, born where we were, we ended
up where we are, we might find it easier to refer to broad social and
economic factors. And that is what our model seeks to do.
A. The Race for the Top
On race-for-the-top theories, states might compete for valuable mi-
grants by offering them efficient legal and governmental institutions.
Even emigration states will copy such institutions, the better to retain
valued subjects. Thus, the competition for migrants is seen to result in a
race to adopt the best set of laws.7
Race-for-the-top migration theories were first stated by Frederick Jack-
son Turner just over one hundred years ago. The 1890 census report
had noted a curious change in American society. Up to that point, the
demographer could always point to a settlement line, beyond which the
pioneer had not ventured. But by 1890, this line had disappeared, with
only small and isolated frontier areas remaining. Thereafter, the frontier
passed into history, and 3 years later, at the Chicago Exposition, Turner
delivered the seminal paper in American historiography on how the fron-
tier had shaped American institutions. States competed for migrants,
6 Kristin A. Hansen, Bureau of the Census, Selected Place of Birth and Migration Statis-
tics for States CPH-L-121 (1990), table 1. This number would be smaller if one excluded
the seniors who move on retirement; however, the number would be larger if one included
the children born to migrants in the new state.
7 Race-for-the-top explanations of the market for migrants resemble race-for-the-top the-
ones in corporate law. Most large American corporations choose to incorporate in Dela-
ware. At one time, it was thought that this was because Delaware law was slanted toward
managers and against shareholders. But this view has not withstood empirical scrutiny, and
most commentators today believe that the greater popularity of Delaware's corporations
law stems from its greater efficiency. See Roberta Romano, The Genius of American Corpo-
rate Law (1993).
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Turner said. To attract them, they liberalized their laws and adopted free
and democratic institutions.8 Western states led the way, and eastern
states followed once they began to lose migrants to the more democratic
Western states. Well before modern public choice scholarship, Turner
described how migrants vote with their feet and how states compete for
subjects.9 His insight that the competition for migrants shaped domestic
institutions remains relevant today. Even if all American states have
adopted democratic institutions, there remains a broad variance in taxa-
tion levels, welfare payouts, legal rules, and governance structures. 0
B. The Race for the Bottom
On race-for-the-top theories, state enact efficient laws in order to at-
tract migrants; on race-for-the-bottom theories, states enact inefficient
laws to do so. The first race-for-the-bottom theory is a vote-seeking one,
under which migrants are inefficiently sought for their future votes. Vote-
seeking theories plausibly account for shifts in U.S. international immi-
gration policies" and may also explain internal migration policies. Thus
a pro-welfare political party might court welfare-loving migrants through
the promise of high welfare payouts, while antiwelfare parties might seek
welfare-haters through reduced welfare benefits. Similarly, antitax parties
will court antitax migrants, while protax parties will court migrants who
support government spending, especially if their taxes are low in a pro-
gressive regime.' 2 The result is a cooperative game in which different
parties in different states trade off voters in the manner of the Jack Spratt
8 Western states sought migrants of both sexes and offered women the franchise and
community property laws. Michael J. Vaughn, The Policy of Community Property and
Inter-spousal Transactions, 19 Baylor L. Rev. 20 (1967); Susan W. Prager, Sharing Princi-
ples and the Future of Marital Property Law, 25 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 1 (1977). In the debate
over the California Constitution, one delegate urged support for community property laws
because "I do not think we can offer a greater inducement for women of fortune to come
to California. It is the very best provision to get us wives." M. R. Kirkwood, Historical
Background and Objectives of the Law of Community Property in the Pacific Coast States,
II Wash. L. Rev. 1, 10 (1936).
9 The modern theory of voting with one's feet dates from C. M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory
of Local Expenditures, 64 J. Pol. Econ. 416 (1956). For a review of current scholarship,
see Dennis C. Mueller, 2 Pub. Choice 154-70 (1989).
10 For an econometric study of how differences in state governmental structures affect
tax and spending levels, see W. Mark Crain & Timothy J. Muris, Legislative Organization
of Fiscal Policy, 38 J. Law & Econ. 311-33 (1995).
1 See F. H. Buckley, The Political Economy of Immigration Policies, 16 Int'l Rev. L.
& Econ. (1996, in press).
12 Vote-seeking theories are somewhat weakened by evidence that welfare recipients are
less likely to vote than other people. See Elaine Sharp, Exit, Voice & Loyalty, 37 W. Pol.
Q. 67 (1980).
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family at table. In neither state will welfare payouts or tax rates be as
low or as high as they would be in a world of closed borders. 3
Second, deadbeat pathologies might infect the market for migrants.
Migration policies which are privately optimal for an immigration state
may not be socially optimal, when losses borne in the emigration state
are taken into account. Thus, an immigration state might compete for
migrants by permitting them, once they have moved, to cut off claims
owed to emigration state creditors. This might be done through fresh
start rights in bankruptcy and family law which permit the debtor to
shelter future income from his creditors and first wives and children.
While socially wasteful, this may be privately optimal for immigration
state natives. The offer to cut off creditor claims will be more valuable for
high-quality debtors, with high future earnings. Because of the promise to
cut off creditor claims, more of them will move to the immigration state,
and they will be richer, having left their creditors behind them. As taxpay-
ers and employers in their new state, they will confer pecuniary benefits
on natives which may exceed the losses to native creditors and debtors
as a consequence of inefficient insolvency policies.
Deadbeats are not an unmixed blessing for the immigration state. Hav-
ing stiffed his creditors once, the deadbeat may be tempted to do so
again, this time at the expense of immigration state creditors. Because
of this, some states may wish to discourage their entry by restricting
fresh start rights. In this way, states may sort themselves into Kingdoms
of Cooperation and Republics of Defection. Any test of the hypothesis
that some states seek to attract deadbeat migrants by strengthening fresh
start rights is simultaneously a test of the hypothesis that other states
seek to deter their entry and encourage their emigration by weakening
such rights.
1. Bankruptcy Deadbeats. Countries may compete for deadbeats
through their bankruptcy laws. For example, fresh start policies in the
American Bankruptcy Code are more pro-debtor than those of rival immi-
gration states, such as Canada. American debtors are given a broad right
to elect between Chapter 7, where present assets are surrendered and
future earnings retained, and Chapter 13, where present assets are re-
tained and future earnings are committed to creditors. An opportunistic
creditor will elect strategically, choosing the option which maximizes his
wealth. Thus, a debtor with few present assets but great expectations
13 Vote-seeking explanations of welfare payouts overlap with bureaucratic explanations
of welfare policies, in which the crucial support for antipoverty measures comes not from
welfare recipients but from welfare administrators. William A. Niskanen, Bureaucracy and
Representative Government 36-42 (1971); Sam Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory
of Regulation, 19 J. Law & Econ. 211 (1976).
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will seek a fresh start under Chapter 7 even if over time he could repay
his debts. By contrast, the Canadian discharge may be suspended or
granted conditionally in order to transfer a portion of the debtor's future
earnings to creditors.14
Cross-country differences in legal norms appear to explain why Cana-
dian consumer bankruptcy filing rates are lower than those in the United
States, for the higher American rates cannot be attributed to differences
in economic variables. 5 Regional differences in the way in which legal
norms are enforced might also explain differences in filing rates within
the United States.' 6 Debtor opportunism is ostensibly policed through
good faith norms under the Bankruptcy Code. 7 These norms were
strengthened in 1984, when § 707(b) permitted a court to reject petitions
which constituted "a substantial abuse." 8 This has been interpreted to
mean that a Chapter 7 filing may be set aside if the debtor proposes to
maintain an exorbitant lifestyle or is able to pay off a substantial portion
of his debt under Chapter 13.'9 In spite of this, the 1984 amendments
coincided with an enormous increase in filing rates. Between 1984 and
1991, a period of substantial prosperity, consumer filings rates under
Chapter 7 tripled.2" While some bankruptcy courts adhered to the rein-
forced good faith norms, others appeared to pay little attention to them,
granting a discharge to debtors who might have repaid all their debts
without undue hardship. For example, one court refused to dismiss a
Chapter 7 petition under § 707(b) even though the debtors had enough
income to repay all claims within 3 years.2' There are also differences in
the way in which bankruptcy trustees interpret good faith norms.
22
Migration theories usefully explain how fresh start policies came to be
introduced in America. Before the Revolution, and during the period of
the Articles of Confederation, American provinces appear to have com-
14 Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3, sec. 172, as amended by Stat.
Can. 1992, c. 27.
15 See F. H. Buckley, The American Fresh Start, 4 S. Cal. Interdisciplinary L. J. 67
(1995).
16 The mean state filing rate for 1985-90, divided by the adult population, is 11.721, with
a standard deviation of 5.773. For a study of the determinants of personal bankruptcy, see
F. H. Buckley & Margaret F. Brinig, The Bankruptcy Puzzle (working paper, George
Mason University Law School 1995).
17 See Buckley, supra note 15.
18 11 U.S.C. § 707(b).
19 See In re Kelly, 841 F.2d 908 (9th Cir. 1988); In re Walton, 86 F.2d 981 (8th Cir. 1989).
20 See generally Buckley, supra note 15.
21 Re Fortune, 130 Bankr. R. 525 (Bankr. C.D. I11. 1991).
22 See Wayne R. Wells, Janell M. Kurtz, & Robert J. Calhoun, The Implementation of
Bankruptcy Code Section 707(b): The Law and the Reality, 39 Clev. St. L. Rev. 15 (1991).
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peted for migrants through generous insolvency legislation. The Con-
tracts Clause of the Constitution was adopted to prevent interstate exploi-
tation of this kind, but state laws fettered creditor collection efforts
throughout the nineteenth century.23 Many states, particularly in the West
and South, made the homestead exempt from seizure for prehomestead
debts.24 Today, what remains of such laws are state law exemptions from
bankruptcy. Bankruptcy Code § 522(d) offers debtors a presumptive list
of assets which they may shelter against unsecured creditors. However,
§ 522(b) permits states to opt out of this list, and about two-thirds have
done so, some to narrow and some to widen the list of exempted assets.
In some states, for example, debtors may shelter only $7,500 in their
house from unsecured creditors; but in other states there is no ceiling on
the value of the homestead exemption.25 Not surprisingly, wealthy debt-
ors have taken advantage of these differences to move to high exemption
states .26
2. Family Deadbeats. Family deadbeats seek to avoid legal obliga-
tions, abandoning their wives and children to public welfare or private
charity. 27 They were the immigrants who never sent back for their wives
and the pioneers who cast off their families to move West. They lived
lives without second acts and gave us the laws of support, alimony, and
divorce. 28 For them, the West offered freedom from family responsibili-
ties as well as the political freedom of the frontier thesis. Even today,
nearly a quarter of family support cases involve deadbeat dads who have
crossed a state line.29
23 See Buckley, supra note 15.
24 See Seymour D. Thompson, A Treatise on Homestead and Exemption Laws (1878);
Joseph W. McKnight, Protection of the Family Home from Seizure by Creditors: The
Sources and Evolution of a Legal Principle, 86 Sw. Hist. Q. 369 (1983).
25 Compare Fla. Const. Art X, § 4; N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law § 5206(a).
26 See Denise M. Topolnicki & Elizabeth M. Macdonald, The Bankruptcy Bonanza!
Money, August 1993, at 82.
27 For a recent example of a woman who went on welfare for more than 2 years when
her husband failed to pay child support, see Sandra Evans, For Va. Woman, Welfare
Wasn't an Easy Ride, Washington Post, February 2, 1995, at BI, col. 1.
28 In the nineteenth century, Western states competed for migrants and divorce litigation
by enacting liberal divorce laws. See Glenda Riley, The Female Frontier: A Comparative
View of the Prairie and the Plains 81 (1988). The pressure for lax divorce laws in the West
was hastened by informal "remarriages," without the benefit of a formal divorce. Like the
informal corporation, bigamous marriages were a "shadow" institution in matrimonial law
with much lower transaction costs. See Henry Butler, Nineteenth Century Jurisdictional
Competition in the Granting of Corporate Privileges, 14 J. Legal. Stud. 139 (1985); Lawrence
J. Friedman & Robert Percival, Who Sues for Divorce? 5 J. Legal Stud. 61, 69 (1976).
29 In 1992, the total number of cases in which support orders were enforced or modified
was 4.37 million. Of these, almost a million involved interstate collections. Department of
Health and Human Services, Office of Child Support Enforcement, Seventeenth Annual
Report to Congress (1992), at 69, table 2, & 148-49, tables 81 and 82.
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Deserted wives can assert a variety of remedies against their spouses.
Desertion was always a ground of divorce, 30 and states mandated child
support obligations. There is, however, a wide variance among states in
family support obligations, and deadbeat spouses have an incentive to
move to low-payout and low-collection states.3 Where the deadbeat can
be located, Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support statutes provide
an expeditious remedy for the deserted spouse, without court filings and
attorney costs. 32 The social service agency in the home state simply sends
a copy of the decree mandating the obligation to the state where the
defendant lives. But states do not all enforce foreign awards in the same
way. In some states, awards are frequently reduced, particularly when
the defendant has remarried and has a new family in the responding
state. 33 Even with reciprocal enforcement of support laws, then, a state
might compete for divorced spouses through the promise of reduced sup-
port obligations.
II. THE EMPIRICAL TEST
These hypotheses offer different predictions about migration patterns.
Race-for-the-top theories predict that states with expanding economies
will attract migrants and that stagnant states with high tax will repel them.
States might also compete for migrants through their legal institutions,
and on race-for-the-top theories, the winner of the competition will have
the most desirable set of laws. Of course, such theories would be circular
if the only evidence of a statute's efficiency was the migration flow itself.
Vote-seeking theories predict that some states will seek to attract mi-
grants through high welfare payouts, while other states will attempt to
30 See Owens v. Owens, 96 Va. 191, 195, 31 S.E. 72, 74 (1898).
31 Relaxed divorce requirements, particularly the enactment of no-fault divorce laws,
encourage opportunistic behavior on the part of spouses with the least to lose by divorce.
See Margaret F. Brinig & Steven M. Crafton, Opportunism in Marriage, 23 J. Legal Stud.
859 (1994).
32 See L. 1952, c. 516 (Virginia); Md. Laws (1957) art. 89C, § 1. The more modem version
of the Virginia law is the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, Va. Code Ann.
§§ 20-88.12-20-88.31, now replaced by the Interstate Family Support Act, Va. Code Ann.
§§ 20-88.32. Both were mandated by the federal Social Security Act, Child Support Enforce-
ment Assistance Amendments, 42 U.S.C. § 658, which also imposed standards for child
support awards.
33 See Fleming v. Fleming, 49 N.C. App. 345, 271 S.E.2d 584 (1980); Sandra Evans,
Candidates' Positions on Social Services Reflect Differences of National Parties, Washing-
ton Post, October 24, 1989, at B1. State barriers to enforcement of support obligations
explain why many plaintiffs vigorously pursue substitute mechanisms with much higher
transaction costs, such as long-arm jurisdiction. See Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84
(1978). In addition, states continue to enact legislation extending jurisdiction so that the
forum state will be able to render final judgments that merely need execution in the obligor's
state. See Va. Code Ann. §§ 8.01-328.1(8) & (9).





FIGURE 1.-Interstate immigration, 1985-91
export them through low welfare payouts. In the same way, states might
trade off voters through differential tax burdens. Finally, deadbeat theo-
ries predict that deadbeat migrants will move to deadbeat havens, which
offer debtors increased protection against creditors. At the same time,
antideadbeat states, which deny a fresh start to debtors, may attract their
own antideadbeat migrants, who seek a civil society with a smaller num-
ber of opportunists. Such migrants would be repelled by deadbeat states.
A. The Migration Flow
Our migration models examine the 1985-90 migration flow in the conti-
nental United States, based on Census Bureau data.34 Our first model
asks what attracted people to the states to which they immigrated. The
dependent variable is IMMIG, the total number of people during that
period who moved from State1 to States, divided by Statej population.
Since we looked at the migrants from the perspective of States, our pre-
dictors were States variables. In our second model, the dependent vari-
able is EMIG, the total number of people who left State, divided by State,
population. Here we asked why migrants moved from State,. We looked
for pushes rather than pulls, and our predictors were State, variables.






FIGURE 2.-Interstate emigration, 1985-91
We are not aware of any other migration study which has looked at
migration flows from both directions.
For both models, we excluded people who moved from their state after
1985 but returned to it by 1990. In addition, a person who made more
than two interstate moves during that period was counted as a single
migrant in the census study. Because of the higher moving costs, we also
excluded migration into or out of Alaska, Hawaii, and offshore territories.
For each of the remaining 48 states, then, migrants might have moved to
any one of 47 different states. In this way, we constructed two tables
with 2,256 observations each. Figures 1, 2, and 3, while less specific,
permit an overview of migration flows.
The 1985-90 migration flow is the most current available data on inter-
state migration in the United States. By 1990, a total of 21,585,297 Ameri-
cans were living in a different state from the one they had lived in 5 years
before.35 The period is a useful one for the purpose of testing migration
theories. It coincided with an enormous increase in American wealth,
15 Id. This amounted to 9.4 percent of the 1985 resident population. See Statistical Ab-
stract of the United States 27 (1993). For 1975-80 migration flows, the comparable figure
was 9.7 percent. See Statistical Abstract of the United States 16 (1985). Over the last 10
years, the mobility rate of Americans has declined, likely as a consequence of the increase
in average age. See Diana DeAre, Geographical Mobility, in U.S. Bureau of the Census,
Population Profile of the United States 1993 (1993), at 10-11, figs. 9 & 10.
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SD
Net changeipopulation less than -30
Net changelpopulation between -30 and -10
Net change/population between -10 and 10
* Net changelpopulation between 10 and 40
Net changelpopulation greater than 40
FIGURE 3.-Net interstate migration, 1985-91
with large interstate variations. It was also a time of tax revolt, when
state tax burdens differed markedly from each other. In addition, there
was substantial variance in state welfare payouts. Finally, the period
coincided with an enormous increase in bankruptcy filings and divorce
petitions, again with a substantial variance in state filing rates.
B. The Determinants of Migration
We considered several different classes of predictors of migration pat-
terns. Our environmental predictors included distance, temperature, pop-
ulation density, and the percentage of the population over 65. Our eco-
nomic predictors were based on figures for construction and employment
growth. To test vote-seeking theories, we included welfare, state tax, and
state debt predictors. Finally, to test deadbeat theories, our predictors
included Chapter 7 consumer bankruptcy petitions and in-state child sup-
port collection rates. We describe these predictors in detail below.
Unless indicated, the source for the independent variables was the
Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1986-94, with 1985 figures se-
lected for our independent variables. While the dependent variable in our
model is total 1985-90 interstate migration per capita population, using
1985 predictors reduced endogeneity concerns.3 6 Under endogeneity,
36 On endogeneity, see Damodar N. Gujarati, Basic Econometrics 573-77 (2d ed. 1988).
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causation works in both directions, and a change in the value of the
dependent variable results in a change in the value of a predictor. For
example, migrants are attracted to states with booming economies, as
measured by relatively high construction figures. But fresh migrants also
mean increased construction, since they will need new homes to live in
and offices to work in. Had we used post-1985 figures, then, a finding that
the construction variable was significant would have been ambiguous. We
also transformed the values of the nondummy variables into their nat-
ural logs, after determining through a Box-Cox test that this was appro-
priate.37
1. Environmental Predictors. Since migration costs increase with the
distance traveled, we included a Distance predictor, measured by the
driving distance between state capitals. A state's capital is usually closer
to its population center than is its largest city. 38 We included a Tempera-
ture variable to test whether the migration trends to sunbelt states con-
tinue, independent of other predictors. As a measure of Temperature, we
took the average January high temperature from 1961 to 1990 in the
largest city of each state, since state capital data were not always avail-
able. We chose January highs because these were the year's lowest, and
we thought that weather-motivated migrants would be most sensitive to
winter weather. To measure migration flows to and from urban states,
we included a Metropolitan variable, representing the extent to which
a state was urbanized. Finally, we adopted an Elderly variable for the
percentage of a state's over-65 population. Some of the cross-border
moves represented postretirement migration, and we assumed that a
state's 1985 proportion of elderly people might serve as a proxy for a
retirement haven.
2. Economic Predictors. Race-for-the-top theories predict that migra-
tion patterns are sensitive to economic conditions. The model's economic
proxies were Construction, the dollar value of completed commercial
and residential construction contracts for new structures and additions,
divided by the adult population; and Employment Growth, the percentage
change in nonfarm employment in a state from 1984 to 1985. More than
other predictors, such as unemployment rates, these two variables plausi-
bly identify growing economies.
37 Box-Cox transformations are discussed in George C. Judge, R. Carter Hill, William
E. Griffiths, Helmut Lutkepohl, & Tsoung-Chao Lee, Introduction to the Theory and Prac-
tice of Econometrics 555-56 (2d ed. 1987). See also G. S. Maddala, Introduction to Econo-
metrics 220-22 (2d ed. 1992).
38 The difference is more important for moves between adjoining states than for cross-
country moves. For example, the move from Albany, N.Y., to Trenton, N.J., is 172 miles,
while the distance from New York City to Newark, N.J., is 9 miles.
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3. Vote-Seeking Predictors. Vote-seeking politicians might compete
for welfare-loving migrants by offering them relatively high welfare pay-
outs. At the same time, politicians who seek the support of welfare haters
might be tempted to reduce welfare payouts below what they would be
in a world of closed borders. As a proxy for welfare, AFDC represents
the average monthly welfare payout under the Aid for Families with De-
pendent Children program. There is a substantial variance in state AFDC
payments, with a mean payout of $293.60 a month per dependent family
and a standard deviation of $102.50. 39
States also compete for migrants by lowering or raising their tax bur-
den. The Tax variable represents total state and municipal tax receipts
from all sources excluding federal transfer payments, divided by the adult
population.4" Under Ricardian equivalence theories,4 a state's debt load
represents anticipated future taxes. Since we sought to test whether the
total tax burden attracts or repels migrants, we added a Debt variable,
representing outstanding state indebtedness as of 1985, divided by the
adult population. The mean Tax figure is $1,613 per adult, with a standard
deviation of $472; the mean Debt figure is $1,372 per adult, with a stan-
dard deviation of $892.
4. Bankruptcy Deadbeats. We hypothesize that some migrants are
attracted to states which are more ready to discharge debtors. While
American bankruptcy law is a matter of federal statute, there are signifi-
cant variations in state filing rates which do not appear attributable to
differential economic conditions. On the hypothesis of deadbeat migra-
tion, then, state bankruptcy filing rates should be positively correlated
with migration flows.
For our bankruptcy deadbeat predictor, we employed personal filing
rates under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. We assumed that a lax
bankruptcy state could most easily be identified by a higher filing rate,
after taking into account the influence of macroeconomic variables. We
excluded the less frequently employed consumer petitions under Chap-
ters 11 (reorganizations) or 12 (farmers). We also excluded Chapter 13
plans, which consign a portion of the debtor's future earnings to pay off
present debts. On average, debtors propose to pay about half of their
39 Because of data limitations, we were unable to adjust AFDC payouts for differences
in state cost of living.
40 Bureau of the Census, Government Finances in 1985-86 (1987).
41 See Robert J. Barro, Are Government Bonds Net Wealth? 48 J. Pol. Econ. 1095 (1974);
John J. Seater, Ricardian Equivalence, 31 J. Econ. Lit. 142 (1993).
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debts under Chapter 13,42 far more than under Chapter 7.43 Because the
Chapter 13 debtor sacrifices part of his fresh start rights, we believe
that he will be less tainted by debtor opportunism than his Chapter 7
counterpart. 44
As a measure of state filing rates, one might select either 1985 filings
or 1985-90 total filings. While the first choice minimizes endogeneity
concerns, it misses the spectacular run-up of consumer filings over the
period of the migration study. For this reason, our Chapter 7 variable
reflects total filings from 1985-90. 45 Since children do not go bankrupt,
we arrived at our per capita filing rate by dividing the filing figures by
the adult population. We addressed the endogeneity problem through a
three-stage least squares system of equations procedure, estimating the
Chapter 7 filing rate through independent instrumental predictors. A
Hausman test confirmed our suspicions that both the Chapter 7 and the
Family Deadbeat predictors were endogenous.46
The move to 1985-90 filings assisted in another way. Bankruptcy filing
rates might ordinarily be thought to signal a depressed economy more
than a lax legal regime. If so, we would expect bankruptcy predictors to
be negatively correlated with migration flows. During the 1985-90 period,
however, consumer bankruptcy filing rates seemed divorced from eco-
nomic reality. The threefold run-up in filing rates largely overlapped with
the 7 fat years of the Reagan economic recovery. We suggest, therefore,
that the run-up is attributable to noneconomic factors. To evidence this,
we conducted an econometric study of annual Chapter 7 filing rates,
42 See Teresa Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren, & Jay Westbrook, As We Forgive Our Debt-
ors: Bankruptcy and Consumer Credit in America 213-17 (1989). Under Bankruptcy Code
§ 1325(b), a court must reject a Chapter 13 plan if an unsecured creditor objects and the
plan does not provide for payment of all of the debtor's disposable income for the next 3
years to creditors.
43 In a study of 1979-82 personal bankruptcy filings, Michelle White reported that unse-
cured creditors received nothing 97 percent of the time, and on average received only
0.11 percent of their claims. See Michelle J. White, Personal Bankruptcy under the 1978
Bankruptcy Code: An Economic Analysis, 63 Ind. L. J. 1, 38-39 (1987).
44 Many Chapter 13 cases are converted to Chapter 7 cases, and these do not show up
in our Chapter 7 figures. See Sullivan, Warren, & Westbrook, supra note 42, at 215 (noting
that about a third of the Chapter 13 cases the authors examined had already failed and
another third were "troubled"). If the point is to measure bad intentions at filing, however,
the initial choice is a better signal of debtor opportunism than a subsequent conversion
decision, which will often result from a change of circumstances.
45 Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Statistics Division, Business and Non-
business Bankruptcy Cases Commenced: By Chapter of the Bankruptcy Code (various
years).
4 The Hausman specification test appears in Judge et al., supra note 37, at 851.
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TABLE I
CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY FILINGS: ORDINARY LEAST SQUARES REGRESSIONS
(Dependent Variable: Annual Consumer Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Filing Rates)
INDEPENDENT REGRESSION
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4)
Year .19857 ...... .14926
(l1.25)* (8.970)*
Metropolitan .14407 ... .11705
(1.997)* (1.663)*
Construction - .049097 .11695 ......
(- .4276) (.9993)
Employment Growth .032030 -. 024016 ......
(.09890) (- .05492)
Unemployment .86949 .83962 .6944 ...
(7.170)* (6.349)* (6.266)*
Gross State Product -. 087886 .58000 ......
(- .5984) (3.153)*
AFDC .33400 - .075561 ... ...
(3.834)* (-.7104)
Divorce .96733 ...... 1.1036
(7.555)* (11.12)*
Case .035863 ... .. . -. 030298
(.6262) (- .4770)
Constant -5.4526 -2.1477 - .55654 -2.0887
(-3.249)* (-.9511) ( -2.827)* (-6.089)*
R 2 (adjusted) .5394 .1466 .1207 .4090
NOTE.-N = 288. The dependent variable represents total personal Chapter 7 filings for each year
from 1985 to 1990 divided by the adult population for that year. Year represents each year during that
period. Metropolitan is the percent of people in a state living in an urban area. Construction is the value
of commercial and residential construction contracts for projects completed within the year, divided by
adult population. Employment Growth refers to percentage nonagricultural job growth. Unemployment
is the average monthly unemployment rate. The Gross State Product figure is divided by adult population.
AFDC is the average payment under the Aid for Families with Dependent Children program. Divorce
is the annual divorce rate per 1,000 population. The Case law dummy variable takes the value of I if
bankruptcy courts within a state appear to adopt lax barriers to debtor opportunism under Bankruptcy
Code § 707(b), and 0 otherwise. All variables have been transformed into their natural logs except for
the Case dummy. t-statistics are in parentheses.
* Significantly different from zero at the 5 percent level (two-tailed test).
with the results reported in Table 1. Our principal finding, that economic
predictors explain little of the state-to-state variance in Chapter 7 filing
rates from 1985 to 1990, 47 is consistent with our assumption that the
Chapter 7 variable is primarily a deadbeat one.
We then conducted two regressions of migration flows on migration
'7 We arrived at a similar conclusion in a subsequent study of the determinants of personal
Chapter 7 filing rates from 1980-91 in Buckley & Brinig, supra note 16.
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predictors. In Table 2, the dependent variable is IMMIG, while Table 3's
dependent variable is EMIG. To predict bankruptcy filing rates in our
System equation, we employed seven instrumental variables: Metropoli-
tan, Construction, Unemployment, AFDC, Employment Growth, Gross
State Product, and Divorce. Metropolitan, Construction, and AFDC pre-
dictors have been described above. Unemployment is the average
monthly unemployment rate. The Gross State Product figure was arrived
at by dividing the total figure by the adult population. 8 The Divorce
predictor represents the average number of divorces per 1,000 popula-
tion.49 Relying on economic predictors is straightforward, since one
would expect a greater number of bankruptcies in an economic downturn.
For similar reasons, we would expect higher bankruptcy rates where the
social safety net, as measured by AFDC payments, is more generous.
We would also expect divorce and bankruptcy rates to be correlated,
since some bankruptcies result from divorce.5
5. Family Deadbeats. We suggest that deadbeat migrants might also
be attracted to jurisdictions which permit them to scale back family obli-
gations. Because states differ widely in the extent to which they enforce
support obligations and subsidize collection efforts, we chose the per-
centage of unpaid child support orders as our Family Deadbeat variable.
Since data for prior years was unavailable, we used 1990 figures. 5' Such
unpaid debts were as high as 85 percent in Florida and as low as 0 percent
in Iowa. The recent example of Virginia shows how sensitive collection
rates are to state collection efforts. In the early 1980s, Virginia ranked
thirteenth in the child support collection. But after state funding was cut
in 1986, the state fell to forty-ninth place.52 After this decline became a
political issue in 1989, Virginia's collection rates improved dramatically. 3
Since our use of 1990 data introduced endogeneity concerns, we sepa-
rately estimated Family Deadbeats in our three-stage least squares equa-
48 Gross State Product is the gross market value of the goods and services attributable
to assets and labor within a state and is the state counterpart of the nation's Gross Domestic
Product.
49 United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstracts
(1987), at 84, table 128.
50 For findings that bankrupts have a higher divorce rate than other Americans, see I
Report of the Commission on Bankruptcy Laws of the United States 42 (1973).
5' Department of Human Services, Office of Child Support Enforcement, Sixteenth An-
nual Report to Congress (1991).
52 See Sandra Evans, Candidates Positions on Social Services Reflect Differences of
National Parties, Washington Post, October 24, 1989, at BI; Peter Baker, A License to
Collect in Va.; State Targets Professionals Owing Child Support, Washington Post, August
16, 1994, at Al.
53 See Baker, supra note 52.
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tion, using nine instrumental variables: Metropolitan, Unemployment,
AFDC, Divorce, Unwed Births, Under 18, Infant Mortality, Working
Women, and Joint Custody. The temptation to default on personal sup-
port obligations is presumably stronger when AFDC payments are rela-
tively high, and there is a greater incentive to share support duties with
the state.5 4 We would also expect to see a larger number of family dead-
beats in high-divorce states, on the assumption that those more likely to
breach marriage vows are more likely to cheat their families in other
ways." Similarly, we would anticipate a positive correlation between
family deadbeat variables and the Unwed Birth rate, measuring the per-
centage of births to unwed mothers. A man who is unwilling to marry
the mother of his children is less likely to support them financially.56 On
the positive side, we would expect to see fewer family deadbeats in states
which prescribe joint custody orders for children on divorce. Noncusto-
dial parents are less likely to pay child support since it is harder for them
to monitor the way their payments are spent.57 As well, the more time
one spends with a child, the stronger the attachment and the greater the
willingness to pay child support.58 Our Joint Custody Dummy variable
took the value of 1 if the relevant family law statute promoted joint cus-
tody orders, and 0 if not. Other predictors of Family Deadbeats were
more ambiguous. A higher percentage in the Under 18 population might
possibly mean better collection mechanisms, assuming economies of
scale. We might also expect to see a positive correlation between the
Infant Mortality rate and Family Deadbeats. Many studies have reported
a relationship between a parent's attachment to his children and the likeli-
hood that they will survive to adulthood 9.5 However, we may be measur-
ing different parents here. Infant mortality is more closely related to
- The incentive to dump one's family onto the state is weakened when state agencies
pursue deadbeat dads. See Barbara Vobejda, Gauging Welfare's Role in Motherhood,
Washington Post, June 2, 1994, at Al.
55 For a study of the determinants of divorce, see Margaret F. Brinig & F. H. Buckley,
Divorce, Legal Rules, and Free Spirits (working paper, George Mason University Law
School 1995).
56 More than 90 percent of the children of divorcing parents live with their mothers. The
number is even higher for the children of parents who have never been married.
57 Yoram Weiss & Robert J. Willis, Children as Collective Goods and Divorce Settle-
ments, 3 J. Lab. Econ. 267 (1985).
58 Margaret F. Brinig & Michael V. Alexeev, Trading at Divorce: Preferences, Legal
Rules and Transaction Costs, 8 Ohio St. J. Dispute Res. 279 (1993).
59 See Philippe Aries, Centuries of Childhood (1962); John Demos, The American Family
in Past Time, 43 Am. Scholar 422 (1974); Viviana Zelitzer, Pricing the Priceless Child: The
Changing Social Value of Children (1985); Margaret F. Brinig, Finite Horizons: The Ameri-
can Family, 2 Int'l J. Children's Rights 293 (1994).
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maternal behavior, while family deadbeat variables generally measure
paternal behavior. We might expect more family deadbeats with a higher
Working Women figure, measuring the percentage of adult women in the
labor force,' since women will have a stronger incentive to work when
their husbands fail to support them. However, working women are less
likely to need spousal support, have more power within individual mar-
riages, and are more apt to share child rearing responsibilities with their
spouse, all of which suggest a negative relationship.
III. RESULTS
In this section we examine the results of our regressions. We look first
at Table l's regression of socioeconomic predictors on annual bankruptcy
filing rates. Since economic predictors appear unable to account for the
variation in state filing rates under Chapter 7, we conclude that our bank-
ruptcy variable may plausibly be regarded as a deadbeat predictor. That
is, differences in state filing rates may in part be attributed to differences
in social and legal sanctions for debtor opportunism. Tables 2 and 3 then
report on what attracts migrants to their immigration state and repels
them from their emigration state.
A. Are Chapter 7 Filing Rates a Deadbeat Predictor?
As a predictor of migration flows, Chapter 7 filing rates are ambiguous.
They might serve as a proxy for lax legal and social barriers to debtor
opportunism. States with high filing rates would then attract deadbeat
migrants and repel migrants seeking more reputable neighbors. But Chap-
ter 7 filing rates might also serve as a proxy for general economic condi-
tions, with higher rates signaling a depressed economy which would repel
migrants.
Because we sought to show that Chapter 7 filing rates were a deadbeat
predictor, we regressed them on socioeconomic variables, with the re-
sults reported in Table 1. Our dependent variable in this table is consumer
bankruptcy filings for each year from 1985 to 1990 divided by adult popu-
lation. For the independent variables, we also provided separate figures
for each year, defined as they were in Section liB. The table also includes
a time trend, Year. In addition, we added a Case law dummy constructed
from 77 reported 1985-90 decisions under Bankruptcy Code § 707(b), as
a proxy for differential legal barriers to bankruptcy. Our Case law dummy
takes the value of 1 when bankruptcy courts in the state have adopted a
0 U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Survey (various years).
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relatively lax interpretation of § 707(b), and 0 otherwise.6 If differential
bankruptcy filing rates can be attributed to differences in legal barriers,
then, we would expect that the Case law coefficient would be positive in
value.
Our principal result in Table 1 is that economic predictors appear to
explain relatively little of the variance in the Chapter 7 Bankruptcy filing
rates. Among economic predictors in the first regression, reported in
column 1, only Unemployment has the expected sign and is significant.
This is true again of the second regression, in column 2, where the eco-
nomic predictors are cross-sectioned. By itself, in the third regression,
Unemployment explains only 12.1 percent of the variance in state filing
rates. These results are consistent with other studies of American con-
sumer bankruptcy filing rates.'
By contrast, the social and legal predictors in the fourth regression
explain 40.9 percent of the variance in filing rates. The Year and Divorce
predictors are both significant at the I percent level, while the Metropoli-
tan predictor is significant at the 5 percent level. Unlike the social pre-
dictors, the Case law dummy variable is insignificant, with an expected
positive sign in the first equation, but with a negative sign in the fourth
equation.
We do not think it useful to speculate about the extent to which the
variance in filing rates is attributable to social as opposed to legal norms.
Social predictors do not exist in a legal vacuum and are themselves influ-
enced by legal norms, while legal norms are influenced by the level of
social sanctions. For example, a court might reasonably enunciate an
apparently lax good faith standard under Bankruptcy Code § 707(b) in a
state where social sanctions adequately deter debtor opportunism. In any
event, our sample of 1985-90 § 707(b) cases is small: only 77 cases from
28 states.
Our study says nothing about the determinants of bankruptcy prior to
1985. Other studies, using macroeconomic and demographic predictors,
have explained considerably more of the variance in pre-1985 filing rates
than we were able to do in our study.63 We believe that the reason for
this is that the decisive shift in filing rates came after 1985, through a
relaxation of social and legal sanctions, and not in 1980 with the introduc-
tion of the new Bankruptcy Code. As well, we did not employ a personal
leverage ratio predictor, as the other studies did. We did not have state
61 A table of the cases is available from the authors on request.
62 See Buckley & Brinig, supra note 16.
63 See Ian Domowitz & Thomas L. Eovaldi, The Impact of the Bankruptcy Reform Act
of 1978 on Consumer Bankruptcy, 36 J. Law & Econ. 803 (1993).
THE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES
data on the level of consumer debt financing. But we would not have
employed a personal leverage predictor even if it had been available.
High personal leverage ratios are more plausibly a consequence than a
cause of high consumer bankruptcy filing rates. On a shift toward a laxer
legal regime, rational debtors will respond by increasing personal lever-
age ratios, for the penalty for default will have been weakened. We would
therefore expect filing rates and leverage ratios to be strongly endog-
enous.
B. What Factors Influence Migration Flows?
Our empirical results on the determinants of migration are found in
Tables 2 and 3, which report on a system of regression equations in which
the values of the bankruptcy and family deadbeat variables, as well as the
migration flow to particular states, are jointly estimated.' The dependent
variable in the first equation of Table 2 is per capita immigration into a
state, while the dependent variable in the first equation of Table 3 is per
capita emigration from a state. In both tables, the second and third equa-
tions estimate Chapter 7 personal bankruptcy filings and the percentage
of unpaid family support obligations, respectively.
The principal result in Table 2, which predicts about 27 percent of the
variance in immigration flows, is that 1985-90 interstate immigration is
consistent with deadbeat theories. Both deadbeat predictors are signifi-
cant and positive, suggesting that deadbeat regimes attract migrants. In
Table 3, which predicts 23 percent of emigration flows, both deadbeat
coefficients are negative, and the Chapter 7 variable is significant.
Through a high filing rate, then, a state might reduce emigration and
increase immigration.
We had expected that our model would have greater success in ex-
plaining immigration than emigration. The emigration decision is more
likely to have emotional consequences than the immigration decision,
since we have more at stake in present homes than in the several states
to which we might move. Because of this, the emigration decision is
more likely determined by personal considerations than the immigration
decision. We therefore place more stock in the Table 2 than the Table 3
results, particularly the finding of significant positive coefficients for the
two deadbeat predictors.
Because our model is in log-log form (with dependent and independent
6' All regression analysis for this article paper was performed on SHAZAM. K. J. White,
SHAZAM: A Comprehensive Computer Program for Regression Models (Version 6), Com-
putational Statistics & Data Analysis, December 1988. Data and analyses are available on
request from the authors.
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variables both transformed into natural logarithms), the coefficients mea-
sure the elasticities of the dependent variables with respect to the pre-
dictors.65 That is, the percentage change in immigration or emigration
flows for a slight change in the value of a predictor is its coefficient. We
may therefore turn to the standardized coefficients of the variables for a
measure of their explanatory power, with a higher coefficient indicating
that the migration flow is more sensitive to a slight change in the value of
the variable. In Table 2, only three variables have a higher standardized
coefficient than the deadbeat variables.' While standardized coefficients
are generally lower in emigration Table 3, the standardized deadbeat coef-
ficients remain larger than those of Temperature, Employment Growth,
Metropolitan, and AFDC.67
These findings might even understate the attractiveness of deadbeat
institutions. Apart from signaling a lax legal regime, high rates of Chapter
7 Bankruptcies and of Family Deadbeats might in part reflect depressed
economic conditions. In an economic downturn, we would expect an
increased number of bankruptcies and a reduced level of family support.
We might then have expected to find that deadbeat coefficients were
negative in Table 2 and positive in Table 3. But their signs were just the
opposite. This might explain the positive Family Deadbeat coefficient in
Table 3. In addition, a high deadbeat value might signal a coarser and
less virtuous state. Morals and manners differ greatly from one country
to another, and there is no reason to think that the values of Californians
and Virginians must be the same. Even as some deadbeats are attracted
to deadbeat states, then, antideadbeats will be attracted to more virtuous
states. These might also explain why we were unable to detect a signifi-
cant coefficient for our Family Deadbeat predictor in Table 3. As for
the Chapter 7 Bankruptcy predictor, the finding of a significant positive
coefficient in Table 2 and of a significant negative one in Table 3 once
again stands out in sharper relief.
Even though we separately estimated Chapter 7 Bankruptcy rates in
the second equation of Table 2, we had continued concerns about endoge-
neity. We had sought to show that migrants were attracted to deadbeat
states but recognized that causation might run the other way. Perhaps
bankruptcy rates are higher in high immigration states because the immi-
65 See Gujarati, supra note 36.
6 These are Distance (0.54) and Construction Starts (0.30). The standardized coefficient
for Chapter 7 Bankruptcies is 0.17 and for Family Deadbeat is 0.24.
67 The Table 3 standardized coefficients are as follows: Chapter 7 Bankruptcies (-0.07);
Family Deadbeat (-0.07); Elderly (0.11); Metropolitan (-0.05); Distance (-0.48); Temper-
ature (- 0.04); Construction (0.11); Tax (0.19); Debt (- 0.11); AFDC (0.05); Employment
Growth (-0.02).
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grants themselves are more likely to file for bankruptcy.' To address this
concern, we reestimated the immigration flows of Table 2, using 1985
bankruptcy filing rates rather than total 1985-90 filing rates as we had
originally done. Once again, both deadbeat predictors were significant
and positive, 69 suggesting that migrants did indeed seek out deadbeat
states.
Migrants appear to regard high state taxes as an unambiguous bad. The
Tax coefficient in Table 2 is significant and negative, and it is significant
and positive in Table 3. Migrants emigrate from high tax states to low
tax ones. In contrast, high Debt values, measuring state debt loads per
adult, are associated with significantly reduced emigration. These results
appear inconsistent with Ricardian equivalence theories, under which
taxpayers are indifferent between tax and debt financing by a state.70 We
can think of three possible explanations for this curious result. First,
Ricardian equivalence might hold, and our variable might simply not pro-
vide an accurate measure of a state's debt burden. If the debt burden
represents future tax liabilities, then what matters is the anticipated in-
come streams of state residents in the future. To estimate this, we should
want to know how prosperous and what the future population of the state
will be. We do not know the answer to the first question and are here
trying to estimate the second. Second, Ricardian equivalence might hold,
but the future tax burden might be reflected in reduced land prices. Thus
a migrant from a high-Debt to a low-Debt state would expect to pay
smaller taxes in the future, but more for his house now. To the extent
68 The endogeneity problem was less of a concern for Table 3, where the prediction was
ambiguous. Assuming that migrants are more likely to go bankrupt, we might have expected
to see a lower bankruptcy rate in a high emigration state because the high-risk population
has declined. In contrast, we might have expected to see a higher bankruptcy rate in a high
emigration state, as opposed to a more neutral state, because there is a greater percent of
possible migrants in the former state, some of whom have not yet migrated.
69 The equation (with t-statistics in parentheses) is IMMIG = 0.3699 SEVEN85 (5.386) +
0.2825 Family Deadbeat (3.362) -0.9543 Distance (-28.81) + 0.2218 Temperature (1.399)
-0.5207 Metropolitan (-7.141 + 0.2117 Elderly (0.9893)) + 1.2458 Construction (12.80)
+ 0.670 Employment Growth (2.212) + 0.5510 AFDC (5.575) - 0.5943 Tax (-5.091) +
0.0024 Debt (0.0487) -. 0024 (-0.0487). R 2 = 0.2864. A table is available from the authors
on request.
We should have been interested to learn whether Chapter 7 bankrupts move around more
than the rest of us. One study reported that the last move of one-tenth of their sample of
bankrupts was an interstate move, which does not appear to make them more mobile than
the average American. See Sullivan, Warren, & Westbrook, supra note 42, at 245. The
same study reported that Chapter 7 debtors were more mobile than Chapter 13 ones, see
id. at 245-46, but this is unsurprising since the latter must show that they have a regular
income.
70 See note 41 supra.
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that this happens, 7 the incentive to move to take advantage of lower
taxes, present or future, is weakened. Third, Ricardian equivalence might
not hold, given the possibility of migration. If present debt loads repre-
sent future tax liabilities, the migrant might stiff the tax man before he
presents the bill by moving to a low-tax jurisdiction. To the extent that
a state shifts the tax burden from present to future residents by financing
through debt rather than taxes, then, it will retain deadbeat natives and
attract deadbeat immigrants.
While migrants regard high taxes as a bad, they view high AFDC pay-
outs as a good. The AFDC coefficient is significant and positive in Table
2, and significant and negative in Table 3. High AFDC payments are
associated with high immigration and low emigration flows. This result
is consistent with previous studies.72 Our finding that migrants dislike
taxes but like AFDC payouts might be thought curious, since higher
welfare payments must be financed through higher taxes. In some states,
the tax repellent might thus swamp the AFDC attractor.73 It is possible,
however, that states are sorting themselves out into low-tax and high-
welfare magnets. By increasing welfare payouts, for example, a state will
trade off welfare lovers for tax haters, attracting the former and repelling
the latter.
The results as to our environmental migration predictors were largely
those we expected. Distance is significant and negative in both Tables 2
and 3, indicating that long distances are regarded as a bad by both immi-
grants and emigrants. Since the transportation and psychic costs of mov-
ing increase with distance, migrants not surprisingly prefer short to long
moves.74 The Temperature coefficient is not significant in either table,
7' See Jagdish N. Bhagwati & John D. Wilson, Income Taxation and International Mobil-
ity (1989). In the empirical literature, there is no consensus on the extent to which tax
differentials are capitalized in land prices. See John Yinger, Howard S. Bloom, Axel
Borsch-Supan, & Helen F. Ladd, Property Taxes and House Values: The Theory and
Estimation of Interjurisdictional Property Tax Capitalization (1988); Kathleen M. Day &
Stanley L. Wiener, Internal Migration and Public Policy: An Introduction to the Issues and
a Review of Empirical Research on Canada, in Issues in the Taxation of Individuals (A.
Maslove ed. 1994).
72 See Richard J. Cebula & B. K. Shaffer, Analysis of Net Interstate Migration: Com-
ment, 41 S. Econ. J. 690 (1975). For anecdotal reports of AFDC-motivated migration, see
note 2 supra.
73 This would explain findings in previous studies of a negative correlation between high
welfare payouts and immigration flows. See Janet R. Pack, Determinants of Migration to
Central Cities, 13 J. Regional Sci. 249 (1973). See also Alan M. Schlottmann & Henry W.
Herzog, Employment Status and the Decision to Migrate, 63 Rev. Econ. & Stat. 590 (1982)
(finding that welfare levels did not appear to influence the decision to emigrate).
74 This result is consistent with earlier studies. See Gary S. Fields, Place-to-Place Migra-
tion: Some New Evidence, 61 Rev. Econ. & Stat. 21 (1979).
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suggesting that any migration trend to the sunbelt is no longer attributable
to the climate.75 The Metropolitan coefficient was negative and significant
in both tables: urbanized states were seen to repel immigrants in Table
2 and to retain emigrants in Table 3. We found the results in Table 3 a
little surprising. A glance at the Census Bureau migration map of regional
migration for 1980-88 reveals a broad movement of people from the more
urbanized Northeast to the less urbanized South and West, 76 and we
might therefore have expected a positive Metropolitan coefficient for
Table 3. Our more detailed study might thus be thought to illustrate the
dangers of looking to broad, regional trends. At the level of state-to-state
migration which we studied, taking other predictors into account, the
effect of urbanization was more ambiguous than appeared on regional
maps. The Elderly coefficient was positive and not significant in Table 2
and positive and significant in Table 3. States with a high proportion of
Elderly citizens were seen to lose emigrants in Table 3, but we did not
detect a retirement haven effect on immigration markets in Table 2. We
suspect that this was because retirement migration is heavily concen-
trated in a few destination states, notably, Florida and Arizona.
Of the economic predictors, the coefficient for Construction was posi-
tive and significant in both tables. We would expect that, to the extent
that it signals a healthy economy, a high Construction value would be
associated with high immigration and low emigration. The positive coef-
ficient for Construction in Table 3 was therefore puzzling. The results
for the Employment Growth predictor were more expected: a positive
coefficient in Table 2 and a negative one in Table 3.
C. The Instrumental Predictors
Our instrumental predictors of Chapter 7 Bankruptcies in the second
equations of Tables 2 and 3 explain about half of the variance in filing
rates. As expected, the coefficients for Unemployment, Divorce, and
AFDC are significant and positive. Those who are unemployed or re-
cently divorced are more likely to be in financial distress, while a high
AFDC payout might make default more attractive. The significant, nega-
tive coefficient for Employment Growth was also expected. We might
75 This result is consistent with other recent studies. See Michael J. Greenwood & Gary
L. Hunt, Jobs versus Amenities in the Analysis of Metropolitan Migration, 25 J. Urban
Econ. 1 (1989). Roback showed that the value of amenities is partially capitalized in higher
rents and wages. Jennifer Roback, Wages, Rents and Amenities: Differences among Work-
ers and Regions, 26 Econ. Inquiry 23 (1988).
76 See Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census Population Trends of the 1980's,
at 30 (1992).
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have expected the coefficients for Construction and Gross State Product
to be significant and negative, on the assumption that a booming economy
will be associated with a lower bankruptcy filing rate. However, the coef-
ficients for both variables were significant and positive. There are two
possible explanations for this result. First, if Chapter 7 Bankruptcies is
a deadbeat and not an economic variable, we should not be surprised to
see higher filing rates during prosperous times. Second, the anomalous
findings might result from our use of 1985 data. While this reduced endo-
geneity concerns, it also weakened our model, since we were asking a
1985 variable to predict bankruptcy filing rates for the following 5 years.
There were few surprises among the Family Deadbeat predictors in
the third equations of Tables 2 and 3. The Unwed Births and Divorce
coefficients were both significant and positive. A spouse who is faithless
in one respect would appear to be faithless in others as well, and states
would seem to sort themselves out along a continuum of promise keepers
and promise breakers. As expected, the Joint Custody Dummy was nega-
tive and significant. Parents would appear more likely to support their
children when they maintain close contact with them through joint cus-
tody orders. The Working Women coefficient was also significant and
negative. Husbands whose wives are working spend more time with their
children and are likely to have a closer attachment to them after divorce.
As well, a working wife is less in need of support. This might also explain
why the AFDC coefficient is positive. Nonworking wives are more likely
to be abandoned when deadbeat dads can offload support obligations
onto the state. The Unemployment coefficient was significant and nega-
tive, likely because unemployed deadbeats are easier to trace, and their
unemployment benefits are easier to garnish. However, we had assumed
that spousal misbehavior was more likely to be an urban phenomenon,77
and we were surprised to see a negative Metropolitan coefficient.
D. The Rational Migrant Hypothesis
One objection to our model may take the form of an attack on rational
expectations in microeconomics. Can one really expect that migrants will
know what the bankruptcy or family support collection rates are in each
state? And if they do not know this, how can they be said to be influenced
by deadbeat laws? The migrant need not know very much about general
economic conditions to move from a depressed to a booming economy:
77 See David L. Chambers, What Makes Fathers Pay? 86-88 (1979), suggesting that
personal knowledge of the payors is the most important factor. The top 7 of the 28 counties
in Michigan for child support collection were all small counties.
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he has only to be laid off in his home state and be offered a new job in
another state. By contrast, the causal link might be thought to require a
greater mental element when the migrant is said to be motivated by differ-
ences in legal regimes.
While this is not the place for a general defense of rational expectations
assumptions, we permit ourselves a few words in support of our model.
Even if the causal nexus might seem tenuous, the success of a model
must be judged on the basis of its predictive ability rather than on intu-
itions about subjective mental states. For the social scientist, then, what
migrants know about bankruptcy or family law is unimportant if bank-
ruptcy law predictors explain migration flows.78
Moreover, it is not implausible to suggest that migrants might have a
general idea of the legal regime in the state from which they move, or
even to which they are moving. When its laws favor deadbeats, a state
may acquire a general reputation as a deadbeat haven, with the reputation
serving as an informational intermediary. The state's reputation will itself
be formed by the separate judgments of individual migrants, and might
be better informed than the judgment of any single migrant.79 By free
riding on the common estimate of mankind, then, an individual migrant
might be able to make a sophisticated judgment about the general legal
regime in the state to which he is immigrating.
We think it plausible to suggest that family deadbeats are aware of
differences in state support duties. Among family lawyers, there appears
to be a broad consensus as to which states are deadbeat havens, and the
family deadbeat will often have retained a lawyer before he moves. 80 In
particular, noncustodial fathers appear quite aware of the enforcement
mechanisms for the payments they are supposed to make. They receive
copies of the statutes pertaining to child support enforcement when the
court makes its order and are typically assigned a probation officer or
"Friend of the Court."-
81
78 See generally C. L. F. Attfield, D. Demery, & N. W. Duck, Rational Expectations in
Macroeconomics: An Introduction to Theory and Evidence 26-28 (2d ed. 1991). The locus
classicus for this defense of positivism is of course Milton Friedman's The Methodology
of Positive Economics, in Essays in Positive Economics 3 (Milton Friedman 1953).
79 Reputational intermediation may therefore coordinate individual action in the same
way that prices do on competitive markets. See F. A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in
Society, 35 Am. Econ. Rev. 519 (1945), reprinted in F. A. Hayek, Individualism and Eco-
nomic Order 77 (1948).
80 Austin Sarat & William L. F. Felstiner, Lawyers and Legal Consciousness: Law Talk
in the Divorce Lawyer's Office, 98 Yale L. J. 1663 (1989).
81 For a detailed, although somewhat dated, description and empirical investigation of
factors leading to collection of child support, see David L. Chambers, Making Fathers Pay:
The Enforcement of Child Support 79-104 (1979).
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E. The Demand for Deadbeats
To say that deadbeat variables explain migration patterns does not
mean that states seek deadbeat migrants. In particular, good faith norms
in bankruptcy are set by federal judges and not by state politicians. Even
if states did not set out to attract deadbeat migrants, however, deadbeat
migration would still be of interest as a supply-side phenomenon. In addi-
tion, differential good faith norms in bankruptcy might represent some-
thing more than a quirk of the law.
Even federal judges might not be immune to interest group pressure.
For example, the largest donor in the plaintiffs' bar is said to help screen
federal judicial nominations for Senator Dianne Feinstein.82 Once ap-
pointed, a bankruptcy judge holds office for a 14-year term and is almost
as immune from political influence as an Article III federal judge with
life tenure.83 Nevertheless, a judge appointed through interest group clout
might have bound himself so closely to its ideology that he has little
room to change after appointment. An ideological commitment usually
represents a durable change in one's preferences, reducing the probability
of a future change of opinions.' And even if the ideological pose is insin-
cere, many of us lack the charm to play the Vicar of Bray without a
loss of face. Quite apart from durable investments in ideology, deadbeat
bankruptcy norms will result in increased work for the bankruptcy bar
from which the judge was appointed and to which he may feel continued
loyalty.
Differential judicial norms might also be attributed to differences in
social norms throughout the country. It is a fallacy to think that people
are the same the world over. Americans are very different from En-
glishmen, and Southerners are very different from New Englanders. In-
deed, our article has sought to show that migration trends, bankruptcy
rates, and family support norms might in part be explained on the basis
of state differences in social norms. We might therefore expect that a
judge's moral code will resemble those of his fellow subjects. In this way,
we get the law we deserve.
IV. CONCLUSION
This article outlines three explanations for why states seek migrants
and tests them by reference to 1985-90 interstate migration. On race-for-
8 See Leslie Spencer, America's Third Political Party? Forbes, October 24, 1994, at 60
(reviewing the influence of the American Trial Lawyer's Association).
83 See Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
84 See Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons (1985).
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the-top theories, states compete for value-increasing migrants by offering
them healthy economies and efficient laws. On vote-seeking theories,
states compete for clienteles of voters, with some states seeking to attract
and some to repel welfare- or tax-loving migrants. On deadbeat theories,
states compete for high human capital debtors by offering them a fresh
start from foreign creditors. In our model, deadbeat and tax variables
are found to be significantly correlated with migration flows, supporting
deadbeat and vote-seeking migration theories.
We ourselves are migrants, as are most of the people we know. Fellow
migrants seem to us more interesting, and perhaps a little brighter, than
the few native Virginians we know. As we grow older, however, we find
we increasingly prefer natives to migrants.
